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I discuss a scenario in which second expert opinions may not benefit decision making. The
introduction of a second expert creates the possibility of partisan bickering, which impairs
information transmission.
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Conventional wisdom has it that second opinion is helpful for wise decision making. However,
there are scenarios that apparently call this principle into question. For example, voters often
do not become better informed about issues by watching election debates than by listening
to speeches given by one candidate or reading reports written by one expert. In this paper, I
demonstrate that, by way of a formal example adapted from the Crawford and Sobel (1982)
model, second opinion is not always helpful.
In my model, there are an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed ex-
perts. The experts have pertinent information that is relevant for the decision maker's
action. For example, candidates (experts) in an election know more about policy issues than
do the voting public (decision maker). The experts communicate with the decision maker
by cheap-talk, in the hope of aecting the decision maker's action. The experts have biases
that make their most preferred actions dierent from the decision maker's, which creates
diculty in communication. In addition, their biases are private information.
Clearly, how messages reect the states determines how eective the decision making
is. In the model, one can nd the formal counterparts of intuitive concepts like \babbling"
and \partisanship." Babbling happens when experts send messages that do not reect the
underlying state. Partisanship happens when experts send a self-serving message despite
the true state. As I show below, babbling is worst for the decision maker since he learns no
information about the state from the experts. On the other hand, having multiple experts
introduces the possibility of a \partisan bickering" equilibrium that is worse than the one-
expert equilibrium.
The relevance of the phenomenon I nd in this example can be justied as follows.
Suppose the party hosting the debate cares about both information transmission and \en-
tertainment value," the latter measured by the frequency of strong disagreement between
experts. Then, he may provide a reward that induces the the partisan-bickering equilibrium.
Austen-Smith (1993) also makes comparisons between one-expert and two-expert com-
munication. He nds the incentive for a single expert to share her information with the
decision maker is weakened when there is another expert simultaneously communicating
with the decision maker. However, he still nds that two-expert communication is more
informative than one-expert communication. This paper, on the other hand, nds that two-
expert sequential communication is not necessarily superior to one-expert communication.
Other papers on multiple-expert communication with setups similar to mine include
those of Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989), Krishna and Morgan (2001a) (2001b), and Gick (2006).
In particular, Krishna and Morgan (2001b) show that two like-biased experts cannot generate
better communication than the less-biased expert alone, though two opposite-biased experts
can. A common feature of these papers is that the experts' biases are common knowledge,
while in mine experts' biases are their private information.
In a parallel paper, Li (2004), I compare eciency of information transmission between
various two-expert mechanisms in the presence of asymmetric information about experts'
biases, including the sequential consultation mechanism utilized in the current note. The
interested reader may refer to that paper for more details of the setup.
12 The Setup
There are two experts and a decision maker. The decision maker takes an action in [ 1;1].
He wants to take an action that is equal to some underlying state, s, randomly and uniformly
distributed on the set S = f 1;0;1g. The decision maker does not know the state, but the
experts do. An expert has a type x, which is a random variable uniformly distributed on the
type space X = f 1;0;1g. An expert is \unbiased" if her type is x = 0, \positive-biased"
if x = 1, and \negative-biased" if x =  1. Experts do not know each other's types a priori.
Neither does the decision maker know the types of the experts. The experts and the decision
maker have utility functions of the form
u(y;s;~ b) =  (y   (s +~ b))
2: (1)
where y is the action taken by the decision maker, s is the true state, and ~ b is the \bias" of
the agent. For the decision maker ~ b = 0, and for an expert of type x 2 X,












Due to quadratic loss preferences, in state s, the ideal action is s+~ b for a decision maker or
expert with bias ~ b. When there is uncertainty about the state, the most preferred action is
E(s) +~ b.
The two-expert communication mechanism I consider is called \sequential consultation,"
which is the same as the \sequential referral" rule of legislation making studied by Austen-
Smith (1993). The decision maker asks one expert rst, whom I call Expert A. She makes a
report, which is observed by a second expert, Expert B, who in turn makes a report based
on both the underlying state and A's report. The decision maker hears both reports and
bases his action on these two reports. This setup can be considered to approximate the
environment of a debate.
The experts' strategies can be dened respectively as
m
A
x : S ! M;
m
B
x : S  S ! M;
where M is the set of possible messages. For A, mA
x(s) is the report sent by an expert of
type x when the true state is s; for B, mB
x (s;t) is the report sent by an expert of type x
1 There exists a fully revealing equilibrium when b  1
2, in which every expert tells the truth and the
decision maker takes the corresponding actions. The restriction that b 2 (2
3;1) ensures that the strategy
prole constructed in Proposition 1 is an equilibrium, and that b 2 (47
70; 13
14) does the same for Proposition 2.
This is not to say, however, the possible inferiority of two-expert equilibria to one-expert equilibria happens
only for these b values. For example, consider b = 5
4, Proposition 1 still holds. Although Proposition 2 does
not hold, there exists an informative equilibrium that gives the decision maker even lower payo than when
the values of b considered in this paper.
2when the true state is s and Expert A has reported t. Throughout the paper, I restrict M
to be f 1;0;1g.The decision maker's strategy is
y : M  M ! [ 1;1];
where y(mA;mB) represents the action taken when the reports are respectively mA and mB.
I consider only pure strategy symmetric equilibria. Encompassing both the case with
two experts and that with a single expert, an equilibrium is a strategy prole that satises
the following conditions:
(EQ1) An expert of any type x 2 X sends the message that maximizes her expected utility
in any state s 2 S, given strategies of the other expert if applicable and the decision
maker.
(EQ2) The decision maker takes action y(m) = E(sjm) when receiving message (pair) m, so
as to maximize his expected payo. The expectation is taken according to his Bayesian
belief.
In the rest of the paper, ym is used instead of y(m) when there is only one expert.
An equilibrium is symmetric if for all i = A;B, x 2 X, s;t 2 S, and m 2 S or S  S,





x (s;t) =  mB
 x( s; t);
(SE3) y(m) =  y( m).
Intuitively, in a symmetric equilibrium experts of type 1 and  1 behave in a similar way,
and states and messages 1 and  1 are treated in a similar way. This results in a symmetric
message distribution.
As in all cheap-talk models, a babbling equilibrium always exists. The messages contain
no information, and the decision maker simply takes action 0, the unconditional expectation
of the state. This equilibrium gives the decision maker the lowest payo possible. However, I
will focus on informative equilibria, meaning equilibria in which the decision maker's action
takes on at least two dierent values with positive probability.
In the rest of the paper, I demonstrate that there exists an informative equilibrium in the
two-expert mechanism that is worse for the decision maker than an informative equilibrium in
the one-expert mechanism. Also, I interpret properties of the former equilibrium, and analyze
why these properties cause information transmission to deteriorate. All detailed proofs can be
found in an online note: http://alcor.concordia.ca/~mingli/research/twoheads bulletin sup.pdf.
3 Equilibrium
First, I characterize an equilibrium of the single-expert mechanism.2
2In fact, this is the unique symmetric equilibrium. Li (2004) proves this fact.
3Consulting One Expert
Proposition 1. For all b 2 (2
3;1), when the decision maker consults only one expert, the
following strategy prole is the unique pure strategy symmetric equilibrium:
1) m0(s) = s, m 1(s) = s   1 if s 6=  1, m 1( 1) =  1, m1(s) = s + 1 if s 6= 1, and
m1(1) = 1;
2) ym = 2
3m.
In equilibrium, the decision maker's expected payo is  10
27   0:3704.
In equilibrium, a biased expert always misrepresents the state when possible. That is,
an expert of type 1 reports state  1 as 0 and 0 as 1. They are able to do so since there
are no forces to counteract or punish biased reports. In a sense, this is the worst that
could happen to the decision maker in an informative equilibrium. It is imaginable that by
introducing another expert, the situation can be improved. Indeed, it is true that there exist
equilibria in sequential consultation that are more informative than the above one-expert
equilibrium. But in the following subsection, I show that it also generates equilibria that are
less informative.
Consulting Two Experts
The following proposition characterizes an equilibrium of the sequential-consultation game.
Proposition 2. When b 2 (47
70; 13
14), and when the decision maker consults the two experts
sequentially, the following strategy prole constitutes an equilibrium:
(1) mA
0 (s) = s, mA
1 (s) = 1, and mA
 1(s) =  1 for all s 2 S;
(2) mB
1 (s; 1) = 1, mB
 1(s;1) =  1 for all s 2 S, mB
x (s; s) = s for all x;s, mB
x (s;0) = 0
for all x;s, mB
0 (0;t) =  t for t =  1;1, mB
0 (1;1) = mB




(3) y(0;mB) = 0 for all mB 2 S, y(1; 1) =  y( 1;1) =  1
7, y(1;0) =  y( 1;0) =
 1
7 or 4
5, y(1;1) =  y( 1; 1) = 4
5.
In this equilibrium, the decision maker's expected payo is  44=105   0:4190, strictly less
than that in Proposition 1.
The main point of the proposition is that two experts may provide less information
than a single expert. I call this phenomenon \Two Heads Are Not Better than One," or
THANBO.
Observe that babbling gives the lowest level of communication. On the other hand,
the equilibrium in Proposition 2 presents an extreme form of partisan bickering|an expert
sending a self-serving message regardless of the underlying state. First, a positive-biased
Expert A reports \1" regardless of the state. In addition, whenever expert A reports \ 1,"
a positive-biased Expert B always refutes her by reporting \1." The behavior of a negative-
biased expert is similar.3 More than half (to be precise, 14=27) of the time, the decision maker
3Note that the equilibrium fails to satisfy monotonicity, since y(1; 1) < y(0; 1). This violation cannot
be resolved by renaming messages, since y(1;1) > y(0;1).
4receives the message pair (1; 1) or ( 1;1). These two pairs have the property that they
are sent in all states:  1;0; and 1, with only a slightly higher chance for one of the states.
In particular, when message pair (1; 1) is received, the conditional distribution of the state
over f 1;0;1g is (3=7;2=7;2=7), which is very close to the unconditional distribution, and
the decision maker indeed takes an action that is close to the unconditional expectation. This
outcome conrms the casual observation that when two experts ercely disagree with each
other, they do not provide too much information to the audience. In fact, the informativeness
of the two-expert equilibrium is largely sustained by the \truthful" reporting of the unbiased
type.
Now, consider the one-expert equilibrium. The message 0 is sent 1=3 of the time, and
can be considered babbling, since the conditional distribution of the state is the same as the
unconditional distribution. The frequency is much lower than the 14=27 of \near babbling"
in the two-expert equilibrium above. In a one-expert mechanism, there is no possibility of
refuting. Thus, an expert with a moderate bias (such as the value of b considered above)
would not \blatantly lie" (for example, report \1" when the state is actually  1), since
it would not be optimal for her. However, a biased Expert A may do so in the two-expert
mechanism, because she anticipates being refuted by Expert B. In the two-expert equilibrium,
a biased Expert B always refutes the report opposite to her bias, even if Expert A's report
matches the underlying state. This is due to a relatively large bias value.
Based on the above discussion, a sucient condition for the THANBO eect is that the
absolute value of bias be relatively large, but not so large that a single biased expert nds
it optimal to send a self-serving message regardless of the state. On the other hand, the
argument in Footnote 1 shows that this condition is not necessary.
The equilibrium in Propsition 2 is not the most informative equilibrium of the game.
In fact, one can construct an equilibrium in which one expert always babbles and is ignored,
and the decision maker and the other expert play according to the strategy prole in Propo-
sition 1. There are also additional equilibria, as shown by Li (2004). Those equilibria indeed
give the decision maker as least as high payos as does the one-expert equilibrium.
To demonstrate the relevance of the equilibrium in Proposition 2, I propose the following
intuitive argument. Suppose the medium of information transmission is provided by a third
party, say, a TV channel who hosts the debate. This third party may care about both
information transmission and \entertainment value," the latter measured by the frequency
of erce contradictions between the experts. Suppose the medium provider gives each expert
a reward whenever one expert says 1 while the other says  1. Then, this reward destroys
the equilibrium in which one expert babbles while the other expert plays the one-expert
equilibrium. To see this, observe that all messages of the babbling expert must be treated the
same way by the decision maker, as otherwise it is impossible for dierent types of experts
to agree on which message is optimal in all states. However, given that all messages are
treated equally by the decision maker, the babbling expert would have a strict preference
for the message that is the opposite of the message sent by the other expert. Since the
other expert is informative, the babbling expert's message has to be informative about the
state as well, a contradiction. The only alternative strategy prole that generates the same
outcomes as the one-expert equilibrium is one in which one expert sends messages according
to that equilibrium, while the other expert says exactly the opposite. In other words, the
5second expert reveals the same information by using completely opposing language. This
equilibrium, however, is ruled out if the reward for contradictions is large enough, as a type
1 expert would not want to say 0 in state  1 because saying 1 instead would bring her a
higher payo. Furthermore, all the equilibria identied by Li (2004) break down when the
reward for contradictions is high enough. On the other hand, the equilibrium I characterize
in Proposition 2 remains one.
4 Conclusion
I show in this paper that the THANBO eect is possible. That is, soliciting advice from two
experts may generate worse equilibria than soliciting advice from just one. The reason is that
partisan bickering, which in eect comes close to babbling, can happen with a high frequency.
An example of this eect is television debates between political candidates or pundits, which
are notoriously uninformative due to their apparent partisan tone. Participants of debates
are encouraged to refute each other or more argumentative debaters are more frequently
chosen, so as to make the programs more entertaining, and hence to increase their ratings.
The utility function and type distribution used in this paper are very stylized, which
simplies the exposition. In fact, the expert's utility function does not have to be quadratic.
All the results, including the equilibrium construction and utility values, will carry through
as long as the expert's utility is a decreasing function of the distance between the decision
maker's action and her most preferred action. If the decision maker's utility is not quadratic,
but is strictly concave, similar results can be established, although the numerical values would
change. Furthermore, prolonging the debate does not necessarily make things better, in that
the rounds that follow the initial round of exchange may be either just repetitions of what
the experts have said in earlier rounds or pure babbling.
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